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ABSTRACT
This paper is an inquiry into the largely unexamined analysis of arguments by analogy (ABA).
By exposing the degree of philosophical complexity, which ultimately renders evaluation of ABA
subjective, we shall see that the most appropriate doxastic attitude to adopt, with respect to the
conclusions drawn from these arguments, is often suspension of judgment. A critical examination
of Copi’s criteria for evaluating ABA shows that while these criteria work well for simple
arguments, they fall when considering more philosophically profound ABA. This paper supports
these claims by using Cleanthes’ teleological argument for the existence of God from Hume’s
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion as a case study.

1. INTRODUCTION
Arguments by analogy are very useful to us. We often construct them to help us decide what
to buy, where to eat, whom to socialize with, and an array of other daily choices. Given the
simple nature of these choices, the arguments are easily and even intuitively evaluated as strong
or weak. However, when an argument by analogy directly involves metaphysical claims, such as
‘god exists,’ in its premises or conclusion, assessment becomes very challenging. This difficulty is
the result of highly interpretive criteria, which are not easily weighed against one another.
Because ABA involving metaphysical claims require such careful and delicate assessment, it
will be sufficient to focus only on a single argument. For this paper, Cleanthes’ teleological
argument presented in Hume’s Diologues Concerning Natural Religion will be used as a case
study. The argument is as follows:
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Look around you: contemplate the whole and every part of it: you will find it to be
nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines,
which again admit of subdivisions, to a degree beyond what human senses and faculties
can trace and explain. All these various machines, and even their most minute parts, are
adjusted to each other with an accuracy, which ravishes into admiration all men, who
have ever contemplated them. The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all
nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of human
contrivance; of human design, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since therefore the
effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the
causes also resemble; and that the Author of nature is somewhat similar to the mind of
man; though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the
work, which he has executed. By this argument alone, do we prove at once the
existence of a Deity, and his similarity to human mind and intelligence (Hume, 2008,
p.45).
However, before Hume’s argument should be studied and tested, it must first be critiqued and
improved, in order to avoid distractions from any faulty logic or confusing language. After all, the
purpose of this paper is to better understand how to evaluate analogical arguments and
encourage thoughtful and careful interpretations of the results.

2. ARGUMENTS BY ANALOGY (ABA)
An Argument by Analogy (ABA) is an inductive argument that uses an analogy to infer a
conclusion. In other words, we say that an argument is analogical when the inference is based on
the assumption that because two or more things are similar in one way, they are also similar in
another way.
Using this definition as a framework, we can reconstruct and simplify Cleanthes’ argument,
while being careful not to distort the original form and logic. The argument should also be
strengthened as much as possible so that the conclusions of this paper are not attributed to
faulty or biased reasoning.

3. IMPROVING CLEANTHES’ ARGUMENT
Here is a simplified version of Cleanthes’ argument:
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R1: The universe resembles a machine in at least one respect, i.e., it functions
harmoniously with itself and consists of subdivisions (ad infinitum), which all have parts
operating appropriately with one another.
R2: Because the universe is similar to a machine in that respect, it also resembles a
machine in another respect, viz. it is caused by human design, thought, wisdom, and
intelligence, i.e. a mind.
R3: The kind of mind necessary for causing the universe is a deity
C: Therefore, a deity exists
With this version or the argument, we see that the likelihood of the conclusion being
accepted depends on the strength of the analogy used to support it. In this case, the analogy is
that a machine resembles the universe in at least one respect. However, this analogy has notable
flaws. As the first line suggests, the mind is something existing in the universe- looking from the
inside out, yet a machine is something we see from the outside, seeing its operation in its
entirety, as an isolated thing. This is not how we understand or experience the universe, as our
minds are only capable of comprehending very little of it at once. Because the inference of this
argument is an assumption about everything i.e. the known universe, a very convincing and
intuitively sound analogy is required. Thus, in order to strengthen the argument, a more
appropriate analogy should be used—one which clearly warrants the inference.
By using the definition of analogy previously stated, we see that the crucial connection
between the two things said to be analogous is that they are similar in at least one way. The
importance of that similarity, however, is relative to the scope of the argument’s inference. For
example, if I have enjoyed every prelude composed by Bach that I have heard, then I can
reasonably infer that I will enjoy hearing any future preludes composed by Bach. In this example
the scope of the inference is obviously justified by the relevant similarities forming the analogy,
viz. both are the same kind of musical composition by the same composer. Furthermore, the
justification for assuming the conclusion is evident because one can easily comprehend the
similarity.
To say that the similarity is easily comprehended is just to say that one can abstract those
qualities said to be had by one thing, and impose them on another thing in a meaningful way. In
the Bach example, I first abstracted the qualities of Bach’s preludes that have led me to enjoy
them, generally, the musical characteristics of Bach’s compositional style, and then imposed
them on another prelude that I have not heard. Hypothetically, I can imagine myself enjoying the

4

unfamiliar prelude because it supposedly shares those qualities. The reason this can be done is
that there is a very low level of vagueness and ambiguity with respect to what I claimed is similar.
In Cleanthes’ argument, the universe is said to be similar to a machine. Unlike the musical
example, which essentially transplants the same (or very similar) qualities of the same (or very
similar) degree from one similar thing to another, Cleanthes claims that the qualities shared by
machines and the universe are of the same kind, but not degree. For a machine, the quality of
admitting of subdivisions is finite, as is functioning harmoniously with itself. For the universe,
however, that quality is effectively infinite. As Hume said, the universe admits of subdivisions “to
a degree beyond what human senses and faculties can trace and explain.” (Hume, 2008. p. 45)
Also, we should make note that comparing machines and the universe is far more complex than
comparing two songs, or any two things of the same type.
This discrepancy creates vagueness between the supposedly shared qualities, making it very
difficult to transplant those qualities onto the universe in a meaningful way. The more a term
becomes an abstraction, the less meaning it carries because its definition is more difficult (if not
impossible) to comprehend. For example, in Section 2 of Enquiry, Hume describes the process of
developing the concept ‘god’ from one’s experience. From the impression of love and wisdom
come the corresponding simple ideas. Those simple ideas, viz. goodness and wisdom, are
transformed into the complex ideas of omniscience and omnipotence. Being “extended without
limitation,” these complex ideas coalesce into a single term—‘god’ (Hume 1999. P. 98). Each time
we combine simple ideas we are entering territory farther and farther away from experience. For
example, I can fully grasp the meaning of the term ‘love,’ by either reflecting on my own
experience or learning from someone else. While ‘love’ simply depicts an experience, ‘infinite
love,’ describes an experience augmented by the vague notion of limitless degree. The
implications of such manipulation are not well understood, and open the doors to a flood of
philosophical questions, like what is an infinite experience of something, what kind of being can
experience infinite love, and does infinite love imply love of everything, even the future?
Therefore, a definition involving infinity has inherently less meaning than the same definition
that does not involve infinity, as ‘infinity’ is extremely vague and so limits our capacity to
comprehend a term that depends on it. So it follows that a concept built of vague terms is a
vague concept. Similarly, the teleological analogy is based on the concepts of infinite subdivision
and infinite auto-functionality. Since these terms are inherently vague, so too is the analogy
which is based on them.
So the analogy should be replaced with something that preserves the essence of the
argument, while simultaneously strengthening it. An enormous sealed factory satisfies these
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criteria. Like the universe, it is something a person would be inside of, thus one’s postulations
would not be based on the entire picture, as opposed to the assumption about machines.
Furthermore, a sealed factory also functions harmoniously with itself, and could very well admit
of subdivisions to such a degree and complexity that human faculties could not possibly
understand or explain them all.
Given these similarities, we need only replace the original machine analogy in the argument
with the sealed factory analogy:
P1-An enormous sealed factory functions harmoniously with itself, consists of
subdivisions which in turn admit of further subdivisions operating efficiently with one
another, and is caused by human design, thought, wisdom, and intelligence, i.e. a mind
P2-The universe resembles an enormous sealed factory in at least two respects: (1) it
functions harmoniously with itself and (2) consists of subdivisions which all have parts
operating efficiently with one another.
P3-Because the universe resembles a sealed factory in those respects, it is reasonable to
infer that it is also similar to a sealed factory in another respect, i.e. (3) it is caused by
human design, thought, wisdom, and intelligence, i.e. a mind.
P4-However, just as a cause is proportional to its effects, the kind of mind necessary for
causing the universe must be proportional to the size of the universe, which it caused
P5-A mind capable of creating the universe is a deity
C-Therefore, a deity (probably) exists, and resembles a human mind

4. EVALUATING THE NEW VERSION OF ARGUM ENT
Though the sealed factory is a more appropriate comparison than the machine, this version
of the teleological argument still does not completely avoid vagueness. Omitting the term
‘infinite’ is a significant improvement because the crucial similarities creating the analogy in P2
are expressed in a meaningful way. Nevertheless, there remains a disproportional progression of
reasonable assumptions from one premise to the next. P1 is descriptive in that it simply states
characteristics of an enormous sealed factory, P2 claims the universe shares those traits, and P3
follows the basic reasoning of induction. So far the argument is straightforward. However, even if
the logic linking P1 through P3 is granted, the logic linking P4 through the conclusion is
questionable. It is true that one either accepts P3 or finds a reason to doubt the analogy, but to
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claim that a deity designed the universe—every force, galaxy, particle, and existent thing—
borders so closely to fantasy and conjuration that it is hard to accept as a logical induction. But
perhaps this skepticism is undeserved.
Despite granting the analogy, it seems there are two possible reasons why one would be
hesitant to accept the conclusion: (1) the inference so closely resembles fantasy that it must
actually be fictitious, or (2) this kind of inference is so unfamiliar that we reject it on purely
psychological grounds, i.e. the mind lacks the necessary comfort and confidence to accept it. If
(2) is the reason, then rejection of the conclusion is unjustified, or should at least face serious
scrutiny, as the root of skepticism lies in a lack of familiarity with such grandiose inferences. If (1)
is the basis of justification for doubting the conclusion, then an argument would be useful, if not
necessary, in order to illustrate clearly why the inference is considered fanciful. Such an
argument could be as follows:
1

F1- Something is said to be fanciful if it involves conjuration or miracles , and it is
considered highly improbable or impossible
F2- A mind-like thing creating the universe resembles something fanciful in that it seems
to involve conjuration and miracles
F3- Thus, a mind-like thing creating the universe also resembles something fanciful in
that it is highly improbable or impossible
C- Therefore, it is highly improbable or impossible that a mind-like thing created the
universe
Interestingly, by comparing the creation and designing of the universe to a miracle, the
counter-intuitive nature of the argument is revealed, especially from an empirical perspective.
Nowhere in nature does anything remotely similar to the creation of the universe happen. When
humans build massive factories the materials used already exist in some form, which in a sense
limits the human capacity to “create” anything. In fact, we can never completely create
something because at least part of that thing will have already existed in some form. Thus, all
human creation is actually partial-creation, as opposed to total-creation, which is a complex idea,
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This refers to miracles in the Humean sense, where a miracle is some phenomenon violating the

laws of nature
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similar to ‘god ,’ and a necessary condition for a deity to cause the universe. Because P6 depends
on some kind of total-creation, there is an element of vagueness that could be reason to doubt
the conclusion. Of course this by itself does not necessarily defeat the argument. However,
keeping this in mind leads one to contemplate that all the material that is the universe must have
come from somewhere, at the very least, from the mind-like being that caused the universe. Just
as contemplating infinity exposed the philosophical baggage of granting meaning to any term
that depends on it, so other mysterious questions arise with the idea of total-creation, such as
how a thing can exist before anything else and then proceed to create everything, the origins of
this deity, and what does it mean to be everything or exist apart from reality? Overall, we should
not ignore the deep complexity left unexplained by the conclusion that a deity created the
universe.
It seems that from the evaluation of the two reasons for being skeptical, a third possibility
arises: (3) perhaps one is skeptical with respect to the conclusion that a deity caused the universe
on the grounds that this inference is too incomplete and unexplained, given its level of
grandiosity. It might not be that the mind is unfamiliar with such grand inferences, or that the
idea is too fantastical, but that the conclusion is so philosophically complex that is requires much
more analysis in order to be accepted. In other words, if one gives assent to the conclusion, they
carry the burden of defending or answering the long line of metaphysical questions that are
inseparable implications of such an inference. In lieu of thorough explanation, one may feel that
suspension of judgment is the most appropriate doxastic attitude to adopt. In effect, one
withholds judgment because she or he realizes the consequences of the conclusion and that she
or he does not understand them, and therefore decides it would be irresponsible to accept it.

5. USING CRITERIA TO EVALUATE ABA AND CONCLUSION
Whether or not this rebuttal is accepted, we are faced with the fact that arguments by
analogy are not easily analyzed or evaluated. Fortunately, Copi is a philosopher well aware of this
issue (Copi 1998). He developed six criteria that can help one analyze arguments by analogy in a
systematic way. Briefly, Copi’s criteria are as follows:
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Just as we are our own cause for our idea of god, we are our own cause of our idea of total-

creation.
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1.

"The number of entities between which the analogy is said to hold"

2.

"The number of varieties in the instances in the premises"

3.

"The number of respect in which the entities involved are said to be analogous"

4.

"The relevance to the respects mentioned in the premises to the further respect
mentioned in the conclusion"

5.

"The number of disanalogies between the instances mentioned only in the premises and
the instance mentioned in the conclusion"

6.

"The modesty (or boldness) of the conclusion relative to the premises" (Copi, pp. 478482 )

However, while Copi’s criteria for analyzing ABA works well for simple analogies comparing
similar things, certain criteria fall short of offering clear and useful results when evaluating subtle
and complex metaphysical arguments, such as teleological arguments for the existence of god.
Furthermore, his language is obviously not intended for a curious reader or someone new to
philosophy. For those reasons, I have simplified and revised Copi’s six criteria into five questions
to consider while reading an ABA:
1.

How many conceivable instances is the inference based on? (more=stronger)

2.

How diverse are the instances? (more=stronger)

3.

How many relevant similarities are shared among the things said to be analogous?

4.

Are there significant differences between the premises and conclusion, which
undermine or weaken the inference?

5.

How reasonable is it to assume the conclusion based on the evidence provided by the
premises.

Now, in order to analyze the sealed factory version of Cleanthes’s ABA, we need only run the
premises of the argument through the five criteria.
1: The universe can be divided and subdivided into an indefinite amount of “parts,” each in
turn resembling a factory. To say that the inference is based on an infinite amount of instances is
unhelpful as we are looking for conceivable instances. This means the number is based on the
motivation of the thinker to discover and consider them. As this number is potentially extremely

9

high, this criterion has shown the analogy to be strong in this respect. 2: The instances are also
extremely diverse. We are talking about the entire universe, and every “part,” which there is an
indefinite number of. This also is a sign of strength for the argument. 3: Generally speaking, the
number of relevant similarities is two, one being that the universe admits of subdivisions like a
sealed factory, and two, that the universe functions harmoniously with itself just as a sealed
factory would. These commonalities are also indefinite if we consider that each subdivision has
parts, functions harmoniously with itself, and with the universe as a whole. The purpose of this
question is to separate the meaningful similarities from insignificant coincidences. For example,
having subdivisions is a meaningful similarity in that it provides crucial support for the inference,
while factories and the universe both having vast amounts of empty space, relative to their size,
is insignificant and irrelevant with respect to the inference. 4: See section 4. 5: In other words,
weigh the inference against the evidence provided by the premises. In this case the scope of the
inference is extremely broad, weakening the inference. In fact, because the conclusion is a
deeply complex metaphysical claim, and because the conclusion is an inference about the entire
universe, this weakens the argument as much as possible. How detrimental this is to the
reasonableness of the argument is not so clear, however.
If all of the criteria had equal weight in determining the strength of the argument, then one
possible way to summarize the analysis is to rate the results of each criterion on a scale of -1 to
+1, affirming or disaffirming the inference, respectively, with 0 representing suspension of
judgment. In this case, criterion 1 (C1) = +1, C2 = +1, C3 = +1, C4 = -1, C5 = -1, with a grand total
of +1. If this were the case, then the argument would be considered strong enough to warrant
acceptance of its conclusion. However, each criterion is not equal with respect to its influence in
determining the strength of the argument. In fact, the importance of each criterion is up to the
discretion of the individual evaluating them. Therefore, it is possible that three unbiased people
could each arrive at different doxastic attitudes with respect to the conclusion.
If the first three criteria were the only questions to consider, then the argument would be as
strong as it could possibly be, given that each criterion has a maximum positive response. In fact,
it would be unreasonable not to accept the conclusion. However, an analysis of the argument
that includes all of the criteria does not yield an objective answer with respect to the argument’s
overall strength. This is because each criterion does not demonstrate or represent a determinate
value or significance for the argument’s strength. In fact, the role of each criterion is relative to
the inference and the context of the argument.
Given these results, and the inherently difficult nature of analysis, we are faced with a kind of
balancing act between evidence and judgment, to determine the most responsible doxastic
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attitude to adopt with respect to the conclusion of Cleanthes’ ABA. Because unbiased logic can
reasonably yield a variety of contradictory results, viz. all three doxastic attitudes, the
responsible position is to remain agnostic. By appreciating the deep philosophical complexity of
the argument, granting the conclusion, and acknowledging strong logic of the first three
premises, we have learned to be very careful while evaluating not only this ABA, but also any
ABA.
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